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FIRST THINGS, FIRST:
A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO
PATENT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
KALI MURRAY*
ABSTRACT

This Article, using the controversy over continuation practices
at the heart of Tafas v. Dudas, examines the impact of patent
exceptionalism on the development of patent administrative law.
In particular, this Article explores the way in which the Federal
Circuit's opinion in Merck v. Kessler can be used to (temporarily)
resolve tensions in how Section 2 of the Patent Act is interpreted
with respect to substantive rulemaking. After this initial review,
this Article attempts to outline a series of "first principles" that
may be useful in resolving the underlying tensions over agency
decision-making in this area. This Article contemplates two useful
principles that might clarify how to resolve controversies over
agency decision-making in patent law. First, the USPTO's policymaking must be reconciled with standard administrative doctrine.
The term "reconciled" is used deliberately to refer to the process of
accommodating the unique demands of patent law to the
administrative state. This is particularly important in light of the
increased range of agency decision-making contemplated by recent
patent reform efforts. Second, any process of reconciliation must
recognize and account for the impact of third party participation
that will arise from stronger administrative action. Outlining
these "first principles" takes on significant importance given the
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. This Article is
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"re-defining" moment associated with current patent reform.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 22, 2007, Dr. Triantafyllos Tafas sued the United
States and Patent Trademark Office ("USPTO") over its newly
issued rules that limited the number and content of what are
termed continuation applications that can be filed by a patentee.'
An interest group or individual suing an agency in federal court
over a newly issued rule is an everyday occurrence in
administrative law. Tafas v. Dudas,2 however, has been treated as
an unusual occurrence in patent law, already provoking
substantial academic and practitioner commentary.
Treating
Tafas as an unusual case obscures what makes it an important
case for the development of a patent administrative law.
This Article, then, has two goals. Initially, I seek to outline
the particular importance of Tafas in usefully marking another
moment where the debate over "patent exceptionalism" in
administrative law is particularly explicit. Tafas offers another
opportunity to reject such exceptionalism in another area: the
question of judicial review of the interpretative decision-making of
the USPTO. 3 Such exceptionalism is not useful in addressing the
problems created by a significant growth in a "politics" of patent
law.
1. Complaint at 1-3, Tafas v. Dudas, No. l:07-cv-846-JCC/TRJ, 2007 WL
3359672, (E.D. Va. Apr. 1 2008); see also Changes to Practice for Continued
Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct
Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg.
46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (reporting the

proposed rule change). On October 17, 2007, Judge Cacheris consolidated
Tafas with another case brought by SmithKline Beecham Corporation, and
Glaxo Group Limited, GlaxoSmithKline d/b/a ("GSK"). Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F.
Supp. 2d 786, 791 (E.D. Va. 2008) (reporting the date of consolidation in an
order denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery). Subsequent citations
will reflect the fact that the parties submitted different pleadings throughout
the rest of the case.
2. 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008).
3. Rejecting such patent exceptionalism within the context of
administrative patent law has been the keen focus of much scholarship in this
area.
See, e.g., William J. Blonigan, Road Work Under Construction:
Administrative Claim Interpretationsand the Path of Greater Deference from

The Federal Circuit to the Patent Office, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 415, 422-24 (2007)
(criticizing failure to accord deference to agency decision-making over claim
construction); Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?

What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J.
269, 294-301 (2007) (criticizing failure of the Federal Circuit to appropriately
defer to agency interpretative choices); Craig A. Nard, Deference, Defiance and

the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1416-23 (1995) (criticizing the failure of
the Federal Circuit to use Chevron deference within the context of
interpretations issued by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences).
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If a retreat from patent exceptionalism in administrative law
is possible, then I next contemplate two useful principles that
might clarify how to resolve future controversies over
interpretative agency decision-making in patent law. First, the
USPTO's policy-making must be reconciled with standard
administrative doctrine. The term "reconciled" is used deliberately
to refer to the process of accommodating the unique demands of
patent law to the administrative state. This is particularly
important in light of the increased range of agency decisionmaking contemplated by recent patent reform efforts. Second, any
process of reconciliation must recognize and account for the impact
of third party participation that will arise from stronger
administrative action. Outlining these "first principles" takes on
significant importance given the re-defining moment associated
with the current patent reform.
II.

TAFAS AND THE PROBLEM OF PATENT EXCEPTIONALISM IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Tafas involves the attempt by the USPTO to limit the ability
of patent owners to file what is known as a "continuation
application," which allows the patentee to continue prosecuting a
patent application if the continuation application is: (1) filed before
patenting, abandonment, or termination of the previous
application; and (2) contains or is amended to contain a specific
reference to an earlier application. 4 The USPTO conducted this
rulemaking under 35 U.S.C. Section 2 (b)(2)(A)-(B) so as to correct
perceived abuses in continuation application practice. 5 Section
2(b)(2)(A)-(B), in relevant part, states that: "[t]he Office... may
establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which (A) shall
govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office; [and] (B) shall be
made in accordance with section 553 of title 5."16 The text of the
Section 2(b)(2)(A) incorporates textual language from a
predecessor provision, Section 6.7 Congress amended the former
Section 6 in 1999 to expand the USPTO's administrative
responsibility in a number of areas. The new Section 2 included
the text of the former Section 6 as well as a number of new
provisions.8

4. 35 U.S.C.A. § 120 (West 2009). Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 808-09.
5. 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2009).

6. Id.
7. Compare 35 U.S.C.A. § 2, with Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593-950,
§ 6, 66 Stat. 792, 793 (1952) (reflecting that the current Section 2 incorporated
aspects of the old § 6). See infra note 113 and accompanying text (quoting the
language of Section 6 of the 1952 Patent Act).
8. Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-572 to -75 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 2.
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After receiving over three hundred forty-three comments from
agencies,
government
property organizations,
intellectual
corporations and individuals, 9 the USPTO issued the rules,
entitled "Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings,
Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and
Examination of Claims in Patent Applications" on August 21,
2007.10 The rules had three key components. First, the rules
limited the number of continuation, continuation-in-part, and a
request for continued examination applications and that could be
filed by a patentee without justification to two sets of
applications.1 1 The rules required that once these limits had been
exceeded, the patentee would have to justify any additional
submission of a continuation, a continuation-in-part, or request for
continued examination application. 12 Second, in a similar vein,
the rules limited the number continuation applications that could
be filed within the same divisional family. 13 Third, the rules
required the patentee to provide additional information if the
patentee filed more than five independent claims or more than
The rule proved remarkably
twenty-five total claims. 14
controversial as limiting such claims could prevent owners from
amending their claims in an unrestricted manner during the
course of a prosecution.
Upon review of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction submitted by GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK'),
Judge James C. Cacheris issued a preliminary injunction on
October 31, 2007, holding that GSK had demonstrated: (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits since the Final Rules were
potentially substantive in nature, 15 and moreover, did not properly
interpret Section 120;16 (2) irreparable harm given the potential
uncertainty associated with patent property rights that would
accompany the suggested limits on continuation practice; 17 (3)
irreparable harm associated with the rules would be greater than
9. Comments on Proposed Changes to Practice for Continuing
Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications
Containing'Patentably Indistinct Claims, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplacomments/fpp-continuation/co
ntinuation comments.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
10. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
11. Id. at 46,716-18.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d. 652, 664 (E.D. Va. 2007).
16. Id. at 665.
17. Id. at 669.
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any administrative difficulties faced by the USPTO if a delay in
issuance was imposed;18 and (4) implementing the rules would be
permanently harmful to patent owners because the Final Rules
potentially undermined the stability of property rights in
patents. 19 After substantive briefing of the issues by the parties
(which was accompanied by the admission of at least thirty-eight
amicus briefs), 20 Judge Cacheris issued a decision on April 1,
2008.21
In the decision, Judge Cacheris granted summary
judgment to Tafas and GSK under Section 706(2) of
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),22 holding that the USPTO
had not acted in "accordance with [the] law" and "in excess of its
statutory jurisdiction [and] authority" by undertaking a
"substantive rulemaking" under Section 2(b) of the Patent Act.23
The USPTO appealed this decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit on May 1, 2008.24
18. Id. at 669-70.
19. Id. at 670.
20. The following parties submitted amicus briefs: Pharmaceutical
Research
and Manufacturers
of America,
Biotechnology Industry
Organization, Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., American Intellectual Property Law
Association, Monsanto Company, William Mitchell College of Law, Intellectual
Property Policy Institute, Human Genome Sciences, Inc., Polestar Capital
Associates, LLC, Norseman Group, LLC, Public Patent Foundation, Computer
and Communications Industry Association, AARP, Consumer Federation of
America, Essential Action, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights,
Initiative for Medicines, Access and Knowledge, Knowledge Ecology
International, Prescription Access Litigation, Public Knowledge, Research on
Innovation, Software Freedom Law Center, CFPH LLC, CropLife America,
Micron Technology, Inc., Federation Internationale Des Conseils En Proprit
Industrielle, AmberWave Systems Corp., Fallbrook Technologies Inc.,
InterDigital Communications LLC, Nano-Terra
Inc.,
Tessera, Inc.,
BioAdvance, Washington Legal Foundation, Life Sciences Greenhouse of
Central Pennslyvania, Pittsburgh Life Sciences Greenhouse, Intellectual
Property
Owners
Association,
Ron
D.
Katznelson,
Teles
AG
Infromationstechnologien, Intellectual Property and Administrative Law and
Public Health Professors, Bar Association of the District of Columbia and
Robert Lelkes. See Justia.com Federal District Court Filings & Dockets, Tafas
v. Dudas, (E.D. Va., filed Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC/TRJ) available
at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-vaedce/caseno- 1:2007cv00846/
caseid-221151/ (listing groups who filed amicus briefs).
21. Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
22. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A),(C) (West
2009) (stating that "[t]he reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;"
and "(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right").
23. Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d. at 811.
24. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), appeal docketed,
No. 08-1352 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2008). Oral argument was held on December 5,
2008. Tafas v. Dudas, No. 08-1352 (Fed. Cir. argued Dec. 5, 2008).
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Why has Tafas, more so than other recent patent
administrative cases, such as Star Fruits SNC v. United States 25 (a
case which addressed whether examiner decisions could be
appealed under the APA) captured the regulated public's
imagination? One answer is that Tafas embodies a number of
emerging trends in the current moment in American patent law
such as: (1) ongoing frustration with the administrative efficiency
of the USPTO; (2) the split in the regulated patent community
between companies, such as pharmaceutical and engineering
corporations that support a "strong" patent right, versus
companies such as computer and software industries that support
a "weaker" patent right; and (3) the emerging power of advocate
groups seeking to advance patent policy in the name of a "public
An equally important answer, however, is the
interest."
importance of the underlying legal issue in the case: should
judicial review of interpretative agency decision-making within the
patent context differ from review in other administrative contexts
(such as environmental law)? Or, as expressed in simpler terms: is
patent law "exceptional" within administrative law? This Section
uses Tafas as a lens to explore the bases for patent exceptionalism,
first by exploring the parties' paradigms as laid out in their
relevant submissions, and then, by exploring why such
exceptionalism has arisen in patent law.
A. Tafas: the New Normal in PatentAdministrative Law
Thomas Kuhn, famously, in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions,26 described the process of scientific discovery as a
cyclical one wherein the "normal science" 27 of a given scientific
field, faced with growing anomalies in understanding a given
concept, is gradually or sometimes abruptly, replaced with a
radically different explanation for that same phenomena. 28 Kuhn
termed this process "paradigm change."29 Kuhn's description of
paradigm shift offers a useful perspective as to why Tafas has
proved so compelling to regulated constituencies. It marks a
moment when the "normal" perspective on the USPTO as a
relatively "weak" administrative actor gives way to a perspective
that seeks a stronger role of the USPTO.
The plaintiffs in Tafas-Dr. Tafas and GSK-presented the
25. 393 F.3d 1277, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that examination
demands, made pursuant to regulations, must be deferred to unless such
demands are arbitrary and capricious).
26. THOMAS

S.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

1970).
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 52-66.
29. Id. at 66.

(2d

ed.
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standard paradigm: the USPTO is a weak administrative actor,
hemmed in by congressional limits on its power outlined in Section
2 of the Patent Act. 30 The USPTO argued otherwise, emphasizing
that the USPTO acts like any other administrative actor, with a
range of strong interpretative options to conduct its agency
mission. 31 Notably, the district court in Tafas re-affirmed the
standard paradigm, seeking continuity rather than radical change
in the ways in which the USPTO's power can be interpreted.
1.

The Plaintiffs'Paradigm:
A "Bound"AdministrativeActor

The consolidated plaintiffs' core arguments in Tafas are
straightforward, and remained so on appeal. 32 First, the USPTO
did not issue interpretative rules as the USPTO initially asserted
in the text of the rules themselves, and therefore, were not
insulated from judicial review under Section 553 the
Administrative Procedure Act. 33
Second, if the USPTO did
conduct a "notice and comment" rulemaking under Section 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, then it was without authority to
do so since Section 2 limits the authority to conduct a rulemaking
on substantive issues. 34 This particular argument relied on the
Federal Circuit's holding in Merck & Co. v. Kessler 35 in a narrow
fashion.
In Merck, the Federal Circuit considered whether the change
in how patent terms were calculated (from seventeen years from
the date of issuance to twenty years from the date of filing) under
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act would impact those
pharmaceutical patents whose term had been granted a

30. Plaintiff Triantayllos Tafas' Memorandum of Law in Support of
Summary Judgment Motion at 14-15, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d. 805
(E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ) [hereinafter Tafas Summary

Judgment Memo].
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 5-10; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Triantafyllos Tafas at 10-11,
Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. filed Sept. 24, 2008) [hereinafter
Tafas Appellee Brief]; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Glaxosmithkline at 9-10,
Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. filed Sept. 24, 2008) [hereinafter
GSK Appellee Brief].
33. Section 553 exempts "interpretative rules, general statement of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice."
5 U.S.C.A. §
553(b)(3)(A) (West 2009); Tafas Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 30, at
8-10; Tafas Appellee Brief, supra note 32, at 14-15; GSK Appellee Brief, supra
note 32, at 9-13.
34. Tafas Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 30, at 8-11; Memorandum
in Support of Glaxosmithkline's Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-20,
Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d. 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-

TRJ).
35. 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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restoration extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act.36 The court
held that those pharmaceutical patents filed before June 8, 1995
were entitled to restoration extension to a twenty year filing term,
except those patents that were protected as of the same date only
because of the restoration extension under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.37 In its decision in Merck, the Federal Circuit examined
whether to give deference to an interpretation issued by the
USPTO.38 In doing so, the court noted that Congress had not
granted the USPTO the authority to undertake what it termed
39
substantive rulemaking.
In light of Merck, the consolidated plaintiffs argued that the
USPTO did not have the power to undertake the regulations at
stake in Tafas.40 The consolidated plaintiffs' argument reflected
the traditional understanding of the USPTO's administrative
powers. According to such a view, the USPTO does not exercise
the same authority as other administrative actors because it is
bound by Congressional constraints. The "bound" administrative
actor is then denied the flexibility associated with other
administrative actors.
The Government's Paradigm:A "Free"Administrative
Actor
41
In a sense, the USPTO' briefs, submitted both at the trial
42
and appellate level, are quite standard for government agency
briefs. Both sets of briefs emphasized that the rules at issue
should be understood within the context of Chevron USA, Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc..43 In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated what
has become known as the famous Chevron "two-step" inquiry in
which a court, faced with judicial review of an agency
interpretation of a statue, examines: (1) "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue," which has been
interpreted to mean that congressional intent is "clear" and
"unambiguously expressed"; and (2) if statutory ambiguity does
exist, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
2.

36. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1546.
37. Id. at 1550-51.
38. Id. 1549-50.

39. Id.
40. Tafas Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 30, at 14-16.
41. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d. 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv846-JCC-TRJ) [hereinafter USPTO Summary Judgment Memo].
42. Brief for Appellants, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. filed
Sept. 24, 2008) [hereinafter USPTO Appellant Brief].
43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); USPTO Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 41,
at 20-23; USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 11-13.
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44
construction of the statute."
In Tafas, the USPTO attempted to place its actions into a
standard Chevron framework. The briefs emphasized four sets of
interlocking premises: (1) Section 2 of the Patent Act expressly
grants statutory authority to the USPTO; 45 (2) the USPTO
conducted such a rulemaking under Section 2; 46 (3) the statutory
text in question, 35 U.S.C. Section 120 was ambiguous since the
Act fails to articulate the number and content of continuation
applications; 47 and (4) therefore, deference was owed to any
4s
interpretative choices undertaken by the USPTO.
A key aspect of the government's attempt to reframe this
debate as a standard administrative law debate was both briefs'
re-reading of Merck. Instead of using Merck as a guide to how to
read a constrained Section 2 (and its predecessor Section 6), the
49
government emphasized a less remarked upon aspect of Merck.
The administrative action at stake in Merck was a policy
statement, entitled a "Final Determination." 50
Thus, the
governmental briefs attempt to "re-read" Merck to insist that the
lack of deference afforded the USPTO came not from a rather
constrained view of the USPTO's Section 2 powers, but because
the USPTO choose to issue its interpretations in a less, formal
51
manner and therefore, was owed less deference.
The ambiguous language of Section 2, however, potentially
undermines the government's primary argumentative premise
(upon which all of its other premises rest) that the USPTO has
express authority to administer its statute. The key phrase of
Section 2-that the USPTO has the ability to "govern the conduct
of proceedings in the Office"5 2 appears to narrow the areas in
which the USPTO can be said to administer the statute. It may,
however, not particularly preclude administration entirely (as
argued by GSK in its reply to the government briefs in the district

44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
45. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 18, 24-28; USPTO Summary

Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 20.
46. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 18, 24-28; USPTO
Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 20.
47. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 22-23; USPTO
Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 17-18.
48. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 22-23; USPTO
Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 17-18.
49. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 22-23; USPTO
Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 17-18.
50. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1548; USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note
23; USPTO Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 17-18.
51. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 22-23; USPTO
Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 17-18.
52. 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(A).

Summary
Summary
Summary
Summary
42, at 22Summary

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:29

court). 53
Thus, the text of Section 2 presents a difficult analytical
problem because the Federal Circuit will ultimately have to
confront what has been termed by Thomas Merrill and Kristin
Hickman as "step zero" of the Chevron framework: the
determination of exactly what type of administrative authority
Congress intended to delegate to the USPTO.54 Merrill and
Hickman contend that "[w]ith respect to 'ordinary' gaps in a
statutory scheme, Chevron represents a presumption that
Congress intends the agency to be primary interpreter. It does not
follow, however, that Congress harbors the same intent with
respect to 'extraordinary gaps' that implicate the scope of an
agency's authority."55 The question of whether Chevron deference
applies to an agency's assessment of its authority to properly
administer its enabling statute is the subject of significant
controversy. Indeed, a circuit split has developed over whether to
accord such deference to an agency's interpretation of its
jurisdictional authority. 56
Notably, Merck itself has been
interpreted to demonstrate a circumstance in which Chevron
deference is not accorded to an agency's interpretation of its
57
jurisdictional authority.
In the Tafas district court proceedings, neither party fully
engaged with this Chevron "step zero" inquiry, although the
USPTO's brief referred to other provisions of Section 2 and other
procedural provisions of the Patent Act to strengthen its argument
that Congress has delegated considerable authority to the USPTO
53. Glaxosmithkline's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Against the "Glaxosmithkline" Plaintiffs at 5-7, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805

(E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ).
54. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 912-13 (2000).
55. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187,
212-19 (2006) (analyzing the modified Chevron framework and proposing
potential ways to reduce its problems).
56. Compare N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that Chevron deference is not given to agency's
interpretation of its jurisdictional authority), with Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that an agency
interpretation of its jurisdictional authority is given Chevron deference);

EEOC v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding
Chevron deference applicable when interpreting EEOC's statute). For further
discussion of these issues, see Melissa Berry, Beyond Chevron's Domain:
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 541, 544-45 (2007) (outlining courts' disagreement over jurisdictional
grants of authority).
57. See Lars Noah,

Interpreting Agency

Enabling Acts:

Misplaced

Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1517 (2000)
(explaining that Chevron deference is not given to an agency's interpretation
of its enabling statute when the ambiguity involves the scope of jurisdiction).
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to administer the Patent Act. 58 In particular, the Government's

briefs referred to: (1) 35 U.S.C. Section 3(a)(2)(A), which outlines
the duties of the Director of the Office; 59 (2) 35 U.S.C. Section 2
(b)(2)(C), which outlines the ability of the USPTO to facilitate the
processing of patent applications;60 and (3) 35 U.S.C. Section
132(b), which outlines the ability of the Director to issue
61
regulations that allow for continued examination of the patent.
Before the district court, the governmental briefs tried to
strengthen the alternative vision of agency interpretative power
that relies on using Section 2 as one textual element among many
62
that constitute the USPTO's power to administer the Patent Act.
The major refinements of both sides' appellate briefs (as opposed
to the briefs submitted to the district court), is that both parties
more fully engage the Chevron "step zero" problem at the heart of
Tafas. For instance, the brief submitted by GSK emphasizes that
Congress has not granted the "Chevron Step Zero" authority to the
63
USPTO, and so any deference to its authority is not warranted.
In support of its position, GSK contends that: Merck implicitly
adopted the position of the Seventh Circuit, which does not grant
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of its
jurisdictional authority, 64 and furthermore, Congress ratified this
decision by not expanding the scope of the USPTO's authority in
1999 (when it revised the pre-existing Section 6).65 By contrast,
the USPTO's reply brief emphasized two themes. First, the
USPTO brief pointed to a competing line of circuit authority,
which states that an agency's interpretation of its jurisdictional
authority is accorded Chevron deference.66 Second, although the
government did not explicitly raise its inter-textual argument from
below, it did attempt to use the Federal Circuit's recent holdings
58. USPTO Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 13-29.
59. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 3(a)(2)(A) (stating that "[tihe Director shall be
responsible for providing policy direction and management supervision for the
Office and for the issuance of patents").
60. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(C) (explaining that "[t]he Office ... shall
facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications, particularly those
which can be filed, stored, processed, searched, and retrieved electronically,
subject to the provisions of section 122 relating to the confidential status of
applications").
61. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 132(b) (West 2009) (proscribing that "[t]he Director
shall prescribe regulations to provide for the continued examination of
applications for patent at the request of the applicant").
62. USPTO Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 41, at 13-29.
63. GSK Appellee Brief, supra note 32, at 14-24.
64. Id. at 20-21.
65. Id. at 24-25.
66. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 21-22; see supra note 55
(reporting the circuit split; listing the circuit's that accord Chevron deference
to an agency's jurisdictional determination).
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in Cooper v. Dudas,67 Lacavera v. Dudas, 68 and Bender v. Dudas69
to support its inter-textual position.70
If the Chevron deference framework is not available to
analyze the rulemaking, then, the question is asked: what
deference is owed at all? The USPTO's brief (briefly) offers the
Skidmore persuasiveness framework as an alternative deferential
framework to the standard Chevron deference framework. 71 The
government contends that rulemakings conducted under Section 2
should be analyzed under the persuasiveness standard outlined in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co..72 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held
that courts can defer to agency interpretations based on a number
of factors, including: (1) the thoroughness of the agency's
consideration; (2) the validity of the agency's reasoning; and (3)
the consistency of the agency's decision-making with earlier and
73
later decisions.
In three recent cases, Christiansonv. HarrisCounty,7 4 United
States v. Mead Corp.,75 and Barnhart v. Walton,76 the Supreme
Court has revived the use of the Skidmore persuasiveness
framework to address those less formal agency interpretations
that do not enjoy the same kind of deference afforded more formal
agency decisions, such as rulemaking and adjudications. The
Government's briefs in Tafas use this framework as a "fall-back"
position, contending that if the USPTO does not enjoy Chevron
deference, then, the USPTO is still entitled to deference based on

67. 536 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Reply Brief for the Appellants, Tafas v.
Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 15, 2008).
68. 441 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007).
69. 490 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2080 (2008).
70. USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 20-21.
71. See USPTO Appellant Brief, supra note 42, at 24 n.3 (arguing that
statute constructions that are not entitled to Chevron deference are still
entitled to Skidmore at a minimum); USPTO Summary Judgment Memo,
supra note 41, at 20, n.11 (asserting that the agency would still qualify under
Skidmore, and use the balancing factors).
72. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
73. Id. at 140.
74. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Christianson held that a Department of Labor
opinion letter was not entitled to the Skidmore persuasiveness framework
because it was not persuasive. Id.
75. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Mead held that a customs ruling letter was
entitled to respect under Skidmore to the extent that it was persuasive. Id. at
234-35.
76. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). The Court in Barnhartupheld a Social Security
Administration regulation, even though it was based on a longstanding
interpretation that had not originally been enacted by formal notice-andcomment rulemaking. Id. at 221-22. Although Barnhartreferred to Chevron
deference and not Skidmore, the Court cited Mead and implicitly employed the
Skidmore persuasiveness framework. Id.
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77
the factors outlined in Skidmore.
Although governmental briefs treat this as a "fall-back"
position, the premise of their argument has a particular valence in
light of the Federal Circuit's decision in Merck. In the key passage
of Merck, the Federal Circuit noted that:

As we have previously held, the broadest of the PTO's rulemaking
powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations directed only to "the conduct of proceedings in the
[PTO]"; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules.
Because Congress has not vested the
Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power, the
"Final Determination" at issue in this case cannot possibly have the
"force and effect of law." Thus, the rule of controlling deference set
forth in Chevron does not apply. Such deference as we owe to the
PTO's interpretive
"Final Determination" regarding the
interrelationship by the URAA and the Hatch-Waxman Act thus
arises, not from the rule of Chevron, but solely from, inter alia, the
thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its reasoning,
i.e., its basic power to persuade if lacking power to control. 78
Two assumptions are immediately clear if the Federal Circuit's
reasoning in Merck is unpacked. First, unlike the defendants'
claim, Merck did not adopt the persuasiveness framework outlined
in Skidmore because of the type of policy interpretation at stake,
but rather because of the limited grant of authority outlined in
Section 6 (the predecessor statute to Section 2).79 Second, and just
as importantly, unlike the Tafas plaintiffs and district court, the
Federal Circuit did not assume that the text of Section 6 (now
Section 2) immediately removes the ability of the USPTO to
conduct "substantive" rulemaking whatsoever. Instead it subjects
that "substantive" rulemaking to the lesser deference outlined in
80
Skidmore.
Recently in Cooper Tech.,8 the Federal Circuit held that the
USPTO did not have the substantive power to undertake
rulemaking under Section 2,82 but once again it did not clarify the
ambiguity of Merck that led to the Tafas district court's strict
presumption against any "substantive" rulemaking under Section
2.83 Thus, the Federal Circuit can play an important role here in
77. See supra note 71 (reporting the USPTO's position that Skidmore
applies where Chevron does not).
78. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549-50 (citations omitted).
79. Id.

80. Id. After rejecting Chevron deference, Merck noted that the amount of
deference owed was due to the rule's "basic power to persuade if lacking power
to control." Id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
81. 536 F.3d at 1330.
82. Id. at 1336.
83. Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
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clarifying the ambiguities of Merck in its appellate review of Tafas,
even if this might create a potential anomaly in the larger
administrative regime to the extent that ordinarily rulemaking is
not subject to Chevron deference. Such a rule ultimately makes
sense, given the clear history and intent behind the grant of
administrative power under Section 6 of the Patent Act (now
Section 2).
Even if its arguments prove unavailing in the Federal Circuit,
the governmental briefs in Tafas mark an important point in the
USPTO's perception of itself. In Tafas, the USPTO attempted to
re-frame itself as a "free" administrative actor, asserting its
authority to behave as any other agency actor within a relevant
field of expertise. Adopting this paradigm shows a significant
change in how the USPTO perceives its institutional role.
For instance, the USPTO's briefs submitted ten years earlier,
in Dickinson v. Zurko,8 4 very much relied on the "exceptional"
paradigm, contending that judicial review of fact-finding
conducted by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI") should be reviewed under the more stringent "clearly
erroneous" standard rather than the more deferential "substantial
evidence" of Section 553 of the APA.85
Acceptance of this
paradigm within the relevant patent community has not been
instantaneous.
Indeed, the majority of the amicus briefs
86
submitted in Tafas adamantly opposed this particular paradigm.
Of three submitted amicus briefs that did support this paradigm,
they can be said, in some sense, to represent the "new" interest
87
groups within the regulated patent community.
84. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).

85. Brief for the Respondents at *5-6, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150
(1999) (No. 98-377), 1999 WL 21278, at *5-6; in Dickerson, the Supreme Court
held that the APA's more deferential standard of judicial review applied to the
USPTO, and not the more searching "clearly erroneous" standard that the
Federal Circuit had been using. Dickerson, 527 U.S. at 155, 165.
86. See Justia.com Federal District Court Filings & Dockets, Tafas v.
Dudas, (E.D. Va., filed Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC/TRJ) available at
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-vaedce/case-no- 1:2007cv00846/caseid-

221151/ (listing nineteen amici curiae in support of the plaintiffs and opposed
to the USPTO's new rules, as compared to three amici supporting the
defendants).

87. See Brief for Amici Curiae Public Patent Foundation, Computer &
Communications Industry Association, AARP, Consumer Federation of
America, Essential Action, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights,
Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge, Knowledge Ecology
International, Prescription Access Litigation, Public Knowledge, Research on

Innovation, and Software Freedom Law Center in Support of Defendants'
Anticipated Motions for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F.
Supp. 2d

805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No.

1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ)

(representing

themselves as "Public Interest Amici" and supporting the USPTO's authority
to issue the final rules at issue in Tafas); Brief of Amicus Curiae Micron
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The linkage of activist groups with the Government's briefs in
Tafas is an interesting development. Coupled with the ongoing
congressional negotiations over the scope of patent reform, these
submissions reflect the extent to which patent law is becoming the
subject of intense interest group conflict at a wide-range of policymaking sites.88
3.

The District Court Decision:Adopting Patent
Exceptionalism as the Norm

The district court's holding in Tafas remained committed to
patent exceptionalism. Judge Cacheris simply held that: "the
Final Rules [were] substantive in nature and exceed the scope of
the USPTO's rulemaking authority under 35 U.S.C. Section
2(b)(2)."8 9 Once outside the scope of Section 2, the Final Rules
were therefore enacted in excess of the USPTO's statutory
jurisdiction and violated Section 706(2) of the APA. 9o The holding,
however, resulted from the court's use of two key constraints that
create a potentially distorted framework in which to address the
paradigm challenge at the heart of Tafas.
Initially, the district court disavowed any reliance on a
Chevron framework, stating that:
[T]he Court emphasizes that its conclusion here renders it
unnecessary to decide whether the USPTO's interpretation of the
Patent Act should be given Chevron deference or whether the Final
Rules run contrary to the Act's provisions. Instead, the Court need
only explain why the Final Rules are substantive in nature and why
they fall outside of Section 2(b)(2). 91
This choice had a profound impact on the analytical structure of
the opinion in that it leads to a cramped reading of Merck. Merck
never stated that judicial review of substantive rulemaking was

Technology, Inc., in Support of the Defendant's Anticipated Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3-5, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ) (arguing that the district court should let a
co-equal branch of government "police its own jurisdiction and ...manage its
own docket"); Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property, Administrative Law
and Public Health Professors in Support of Defendants' Anticipated Motions
for Summary Judgment at 1-5, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ) (advocating Chevron deference to the
USPTO's rules on the number of patent applications, which the amicus
authors' view as procedural rather than substantive rulemaking).
88. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 341-48 (2005) (analyzing the use of
neutral principles in patent reform to counteract impact of interest groups on
patent law reform).
89. Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 811 n.4.
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entirely precluded. Rather, Merck declared that such substantive
interpretations issued by the USPTO would be subject to a
92
Skidmore persuasiveness framework.
Thus Merck does not stand for the proposition that
substantive rulemaking can never be conducted by the USPTO.
The Tafas district court's misreading of Merck within a standard
administrative framework has the unfortunate consequence of
heightening Merck's subtle use of the "substantive/procedural"
distinction-as a way to define the ultimate persuasiveness of a
given agency decision-making-to the strict presumption that the
USPTO cannot undertake any substantive rulemaking at all. This
strict presumption, furthermore, will place courts in the difficult
position of determining whether the disputed agency action is a
procedural or substantive one. Such an inquiry has often been
called "one of the most difficult decisions in administrative law"
and one on which neither Congress nor the courts have provided
much useful guidance. 93 Indeed, the Federal Circuit can and
should use Tafas to reject this strict presumption.
Additionally, the district court's insistence on the USPTO
distinctiveness is reinforced by its constrained textual analysis of
Section 2. In particular, the Tafas court stressed the presence of
the term "and," indicating that the text of Section 2(b)(2)(A) and
(B) need to be read together, to require that the USPTO undertake
notice and comment rulemakings under Section 553 of the APA
94
when seeking to determine procedures for agency proceedings.
Thomas Fields has subjected this particular interpretation to a
withering criticism, noting that the court's reading would require
that the USPTO conduct notice and comment rulemaking for its
procedural rules, when traditionally the text of Section 553(b)
itself exempts such rules from review under the APA. 95 Like the
92. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1543; see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Merck's rejection of Chevron deference when reviewing a USPTO
final determination, but implicit adoption of Skidmore persuasiveness).
93. WILLIAM K.

Fox,

UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 186 (5th ed.

2008). See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1705 (2007) (outlining scholarly consensus on difficulty of applying
substantive distinctions between substantive and procedural rules). As
Herbert Wamsley noted in 1982, as this same debate occurred around the
USPTO's use of rulemaking powers under Section 6 (Section 2's predecessor),
"[a]ny rule, however, even a purely advisory one, is "substantive" if it deals
with the substantive requirements of the laws administered by the agency, in
contrast to the agency's rules of practice or other procedural requirements."
Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks (Part2), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 539, 542 (1982).
94. Merck, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
95. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Tafas v. Dudas: Elephants in Mouseholes,
IPFrontline, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.ipfrontline.condepts/article.asp
?id=18491&deptid=4.
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court's reading of Merck, its reading of the textual elements of
Section 2 enshrines a patent exceptionalism even where basic
elements of the law do not sustain this premise.
In many ways, despite its logical flaws, the district court's
decision reflects the difficulty of the choice it faced. The strict
presumption that the USPTO cannot conduct substantive
rulemaking at all might be a necessary alternative to the
Government's insistence on Chevron deference to rulemaking,
96
even where it was conducted with potentially significant flaws.
But there is another option. The alternative to, of course, is the
Federal Circuit's useful guidance in Merck. So long as Section 2
contains a limited grant of power, then the Skidmore
persuasiveness framework should apply to notice and comment
97
rulemaking on substantive issue.
Using the Skidmore framework would have three significant
benefits. First, it has the benefit of simplicity insofar as it does
not depend on Congress to revise Section 2 (a task that has proven
to be particularly difficult within the context of current patent
reform). Second, use of the framework allows significant judicial
review of the USPTO's interpretative decision-making (a choice
that is potentially not allowed under the district court's strict
presumption against substantive rulemaking).
Finally, the
Federal Circuit has significant experience in applying the
Skidmore persuasiveness framework 98 and indeed, has thoroughly

96. At least one amicus brief focused on the significant flaws associated
with the USPTO's conduct during the rulemaking process. Memorandum of
Amicus Curiae Ron D. Katznelson in Support of Plaintiffs Motions for
Summary Judgment at 1-7, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2008) (No. 1:07-cv-846-JCC-TRJ), 2007 WL 5061369 at *1-7.
97. This is not an ideal situation since the court would still engage in the
difficult determination whether the USPTO engaged in substantive or
procedural rulemaking. See supra note 93 (explaining that resolving this
question is a particularly difficult choice in administrative law). The district
court's ruling, however, would create a significant disincentive to actually
conduct rulemakings on any issue if no deference is accorded to the USPTO's
decision-making at all. The Skidmore framework also benefits from having
been examined within the academic literature. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman
& Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259-71 (2007) (providing empirical evidence of the use
of the Skidmore persuasiveness framework).
98. The Federal Circuit has applied the Skidmore persuasiveness
framework within the context of at least one patent case. See Bayer AG v.
Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 298 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the
Skidmore persuasiveness factors). The Federal Circuit has used the Skidmore
framework to deferentially analyze agency interpretative decision-making in a
variety of contexts. See, e.g., MetChem, Inc., v. United States, 513 F.3d 1342,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Skidmore framework to give some deference to
customs classifications ruling); Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States, 450
F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (denying Skidmore framework deference to
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explored the contours of its Skidmore approach in two major cases,
Mead99 and Cathedral Candle Co. v. United States International
Trade Commission.0 0
In Mead, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit considered whether to defer to the International Trade
Commission's ("ITC") classification ruling that imported day
planners should be classified as bound diaries.' 0 ' In rejecting
deference to that classification ruling, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that in addition to the Skidmore factors, the court
would consider the relative expertise of the Commission in
undertaking its classification. 0 2
In Cathedral Candle, the Federal Circuit examined whether
to defer to the ITC's interpretation that a disclosure provision of
the now repealed Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (commonly called the Byrd Amendment) 103 did not override a
confidentiality provision of the Tariff Act of 1930.104 The majority
opinion in Cathedral Candle, authored by Circuit Judge Bryson, is
a thoughtful examination of the Skidmore persuasiveness
framework.
In particular, in analyzing the Skidmore
persuasiveness framework, Judge Bryson stated that use of
Skidmore did not mean that the Federal Circuit could not conduct
an independent review of the statutory provision at issue, but
rather had to:
[D]efer to an agency interpretation of the statute that it administers
if the agency has conducted a careful analysis of the statutory issue,
if the agency's position has been consistent and reflects agency-wide
policy, and if the agency's position constitutes a reasonable
conclusion as to the proper construction of the statute, even if we
might not have adopted that construction without the benefit of the
10 5
agency's analysis.
The Federal Circuit's approach in Mead and Cathedral
Candle usefully articulates a way to approach the question of
"patent exceptionalism" in so far as it recognizes that Section 2
an argument advanced in litigation by the International Trade Commission);
Eldredge v. Dept. of Interior, 451 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(rejecting Skidmore framework deference to advisory opinions); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (according no
Skidmore framework deference to classifications in internal IRS documents).
99. 283 F.3d at 1346.
100. 400 F.3d 1352, 1365-68 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
101. Mead, 283 F.3d at 1344.
102. 283 F.3d at 1346.
103. Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 to -75 (2000) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(c) (West 2009)) (repealed 2006).
104. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f (West 2009); Cathedral Candle, 400 F.3d at 1365-

68.
105. 400 F.3d at 1366.

2008]

A PrincipledApproach to Patent Administrative Law

47

accords a narrow scope for the USPTO to conduct rulemaking but
still allows review for of its interpretative choices under a rigorous
framework that adheres to standard principles of administrative
law. Additionally, Mead and Cathedral Candle can usefully
ground Merck as a case in which standard administrative law
principles are at stake. This undermines a key consequence of
patent exceptionalism in which other important sources of
are not fully
administrative interpretations by the Federal Circuit
10 6
jurisprudence.
patent
overall
an
into
assimilated
It appears anomalous that a rulemaking, conducted through
the notice-and-comment process, would not be given Chevron
deference. Chevron deference, while granting a strong preference
to notice-and-comment rulemaking, does not automatically apply
to every rulemaking. The majority opinion in Mead, authored by
Justice Souter, noted that while notice-and-comment was a "good
indicator" that Congress intended to accord deference, the primary
indicator of Chevron deference is whether Congress intended the
rules to have what he terms the "force of law." 107
Amy Wildmuth noted that Justice Souter's opinion "leaves the
door open for Congress to override this [Chevron] presumption by
providing in clear terms that, although it is requiring the agency
to engage in, for example, notice-and-comment [rulemaking],08 the
rules adopted by the agency are not to have the force of law."'
Indeed, the Federal Circuit had previously applied Skidmore
deference in a circumstance where the agency had engaged in
In Rubie's Costume Co. v.
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
09
United States, the Federal Circuit examined whether a tariff
classification ruling published pursuant to notice-and-comment
rule making could be accorded deference under Chevron.110 The
Federal Circuit concluded that all custom classification rulingsthrough notice-and-comment
those conducted
including
rulemaking-could only be accorded Skidmore deference."'
106. In 1995, Craig Nard noted that the Federal Circuit itself has often
adopted a much more consistent approach to administrative law within its
review of the ITC's cases. Nard, supra note 3, at 1432.
107. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32 n.11.
108. Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What
Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1885 (2006).
109. 337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
110. Id. at 1355.
111. Id. Despite the fact that "the classification ruling before the Supreme
Court in Mead was not . . . subject to a deliberative notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, we read the Court's holding as applying to all Customs
classification rulings." Id. (citing Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States,
264 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (concluding
that import classification rulings are not entitled to Chevron deference). After
rejecting Chevron deference, however, the court did approve of using the
Skidmore framework to accord some deference to persuasive classifications of
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Arguably, the textual ambiguity of Section 2 creates a
circumstance where a notice-and-comment rulemaking may not be
accorded judicial deference. Ultimately, Skidmore deference is the
appropriate framework for courts to employ when addressing the
consequences of the potentially ambiguous grant of authority
under Section 2.
B.

Why Patent Exceptionalism?

The paradigm of patent exceptionalism, as demonstrated by
Tafas, is one with long-standing power within the context of
patent law given that the inclusion of Section 6 in the Patent Act
has always been seen to be a relatively straightforward choice.
Congress included this language in the Patent Act of 1870 and the
drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 simply repeated the language of
the previous statute.11 2 Thus, the intent of the drafters of the 1952
Patent Act just reflected the already pre-existing understanding
that the USPTO would not exercise a full rulemaking ability. The
text of Section 6, though, was in many ways an anachronism.
Indeed, the inclusion of Section 6 in the 1952 Patent Act, was a
choice that deliberately sought to minimize the impact of the APA
on the patent regime. Re-casting the historical context under
which Section 6 was passed heightens awareness that patent
exceptionalism did not emerge from the basic nature of the
administrative tasks undertaken by the USPTO. In its entirety,
Section 6 of the Patent Act of 1952 stated that:
The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary of
Commerce, shall superintend or perform all duties required by law
respecting the granting and issuing of patents and the registration
of trademarks; and he shall have charge of property belonging to the
Patent Office. He may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
113
conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office.
Section 6 of the Patent Act combined two previous statutory
provisions together. 114 The second sentence of Section 6 was
derived from Section 19 of the Patent Act of 1870.115 Section 19
stated "[t]hat the commissioner, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time establish rules
imports. Rubie's Costume, 337 F.3d at 1355.
112. Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of
Patentsand Trademarks (Part1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 490, 493-97 (1982).
113. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593-950, § 6, 66 Stat. 792, 793 (1952)

(current version at 35 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2009)).
114. SEN. REP. NO.

82-1979, at 2405

(1952),

as reprinted in 1952

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2405.
115. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 (1870) (current

version at 35 U.S.C.A. § 2.
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and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of the
proceedings in the patent office." 116 As Herbert Wamsley noted in
his definitive account of the legislative history of Section 6, "there
is no evidence any change in substance was intended in the
provision that became Section 6 of Title 35 of the United States
Code granting the Commissioner rulemaking power."" 7 The text
of Section 6, then, is remarkable in its adherence to continuity
with earlier law.
This text, however, when viewed in its proper historical
context, should be seen as a radical choice. Historical treatments
of the patent regime have tended to focus on the development of
the patent regime in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Recently, however, these treatments have begun to focus on how
patent law evolved in the twentieth century. For instance, Steven
Wilf has examined how controversy over the movement from
individual inventors to a more institutional model of scientific
8
development has impacted patent law."1
An equally important development for patent law, and in
particular, the drafting of Section 6, was the ongoing controversy
that surrounded the expansion of the administrative state in
1930s, and the subsequent use of administrative law to control
that expansion.
Recent scholarship has stressed successive
attempts in Congress, beginning in 1933, to pass an
administrative law bill that would have constrained the powers of
federal agencies, which had experienced an explosive growth as a
result of the New Deal regime. 119
From 1929 to 1946, Congress attempted to pass at least four
major bills that sought comprehensive administrative reform.
First, the Norris Bill (1929), sought to establish a Court of
Administrative Justice, which would have consolidated all of the
administrative courts (including the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals) into one pre-eminent court. 20 Second, the Logan-Cellar
Bill (1936), sought to impose additional adjudicatory procedures on

116. Id.
117. Wamsley, supra note 112, at 497.

118. Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American
Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 139, 198-03 (2008).

119. For a comprehensive account of the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative ProcedureAct Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L.
REV.
1557, 1561-78 (1996) (outlining the historical circumstances for

understanding the passage of the APA); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of
Deference: Courts, Expertise and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 405 (2007) (exploring the impact of the New Deal

on administrative law).
120. S.5154, 70th Cong., (2d Sess. 1929); see also Shepherd, supra note 119,
at 566-68 (recounting the legislative history of the never enacted Norris Bill).
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agency behavior. 121 Third, the Walter-Logan Bill (1939), the most
sweeping of the suggested bills, which, among other items, sought
to formalize rulemaking to provide for inter-department review of
decisions in all agencies, and to provide for review by federal
122
appellate courts of all final decisions of administrative agencies.
Fourth, the McCarran-Sumners Bill (1944), which ultimately led
to the passage of the APA and included many of its major
provisions, such as the substantive publication requirements,
formal and informal rulemakings, and full hearings for
1 23
adjudications.
Of these bills, the Walter-Logan Bill was the most
controversial because it exempted many agencies, including the
USPTO from its purview. 124 The attempted passage of the WalterLogan Bill was accompanied by a vociferous debate over whether
the agencies of federal government should enjoy the significant
125
increase in their powers that occurred during the New Deal.
Such exemptions continued in subsequent drafts of administrative
law bills. For instance, an early predecessor of the eventual
McCarran-Sumners Bill exempted the USPTO from formalized
126
adjudicatory proceedings.
The opposition to the any major changes in the patent
administrative regime during the New Deal Era is striking and
Both the regulated community as well as
consistent. 127

121. S. 3787, 74th Cong., (2d Sess. 1936); see also Shepherd, supra note 119,
at 1578-79 (reviewing the legislative history of the Logan-Cellar Bill that died
in committee).
122. S. 915, 76th Cong., (1st Sess. 1940); see also Shepherd, supra note 119,
at 1593-28 (exploring the legislative history of the Walter-Logan Bill that
Congress enacted but President Roosevelt vetoed).
123. S. 2030, 78th Cong., (2d Sess. 1944); H.R. 5081, 78th Cong., (2d Sess.
1944); see also Shepherd, supra note 119, at 1649-52 (examining the legislative
history of the McCarran-Sumners Bill that would become the APA).
124. S. 915 at § 7; see also Shepherd, supra note 119, at 1618 (listing the
Patent Office as one of the many federal agencies that would have been
exempt from the Walter-Logan Bill).
125. Compare O.R. McGuire, The American Bar Association'sAdministrative
Law Bill, 1 LA L. REV. 550, 556 (1939) (discussing the ABA's support for a bill
similar to, but with significant difference from, the Walter-Logan Bill), with
Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Administrative Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable,
2 LA L. REV. 294, 294-300 (1940) (opposing ABA's bill because a uniformed
procedure was believed to be unworkable in this context).
126. H.R. 3464, 77th Cong. § 708(c) (1st Sess. 1941); see also Shepherd,
supra note 119, at 1636-38 (remarking that unlike prior legislation that
exempted a number of federal agencies, only the USPTO office sought an
exemption under this bill).
See
127. Academic commentators also remarked upon this resistance.
William Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a
Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 951 (1940) (arguing
that because the patent system came before administrative law principles
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administrators expressed consistent opposition to inclusion in the
administrative regime. From 1931 until 1941, the Section of
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law of the American Bar
Association ("the Section") consistently opposed any major changes
to the patent regime, including:
eIn 1936, the Section opposed the consolidated Administrative
Court;

128

*In 1937, the Section objected to the inability to sue the
129
Tennessee Valley Authority for patent infringement,
13
0
opposed a consolidated Administrative Court,
and
convinced the Section of Administrative Law to exclude the
Patent Act from its suggested Administrative Law Bill
131
(which ultimately became the Walter-Logan Bill);
*In 1938, the Section reported continued lobbying to exclude the
132
Patent Act from the suggested Walter-Logan Bill;
*In 1939, the Section reported continued lobbying to exclude the
133
Patent Act from the suggested Walter-Logan Bill;
*In 1940, the Section opposed the consolidated Administrative
Court."3

The Section began to lessen its opposition, beginning in 1942.
In particular, the Section decided to follow the broader ABA
position on comprehensive administrative law reform, which had
expanded to covering all federal agencies. 135 The Section, however,
continued to object to two key provisions of administrative law

developed, patents should not be analyzed through an administrative law
regime). Notably, Mr. Redin focused his attention on the problem of judicial
review of patents in private litigation. Id. at 955-66.
128.
129.

1936 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 10.
1937 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 10.

130. Id. at 13-14.
131. Id. at 23.
132.
133.
134.

1938 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 6.
1939 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 17-20.
1940 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 12.

135. See 1942 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 22

(reporting that the Section resolved to "take no action whatsoever" against
proposed legislation H.R. 3464, 4238; S. 674, 675 and 918, other than two
objections); infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the Section's two
objections to the proposed administrative act legislation).
The Section described the proposed legislation as being the result
collaboration between the ABA and the Attorney General. 1942 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 22; see also Shepherd, supra note

119, at 1647 (describing the ABA's transformation from adamant opposition to
compromise in the period 1941-45, regarding passage of an administrative
act). The proposed legislation that the Section no longer opposed did include
all federal agencies, unlike previous versions which had excepted the USPTO
and other departments. Id. at 1649.
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reforms. In particular, the Section objected to the provisions of the
suggested reform that would alter the existing rules for
admissions to the USPTO (by granting any individual the ability
to practice before the Office), as well those portions that "would
lend statutory force to Patent Office rules not arising in
statute."136 In 1943, the Section continued to support the ABA's
suggested draft but also continued to raise objections to proposed
administrative rules of practice that would allow any lawyer to
practice before the USPTO and exclude non-lawyers from practice
before the USPTO. 137 By 1944, the Section, commenting on the
Walter-McCarran Bill, generally approved of the Bill, but noted
continuing objections with: (1) the use of notice and comment
rulemaking to promulgate substantive rules "not based on
statute"; (2) the provisions of the Bill that sought to replace Board
of Appeals and the Board of Interference Examiners with an
independent set of administrative commissioners; and (3) the
1 38
admission of attorneys without technical or scientific expertise.
The regulators themselves also expressed considerable
ambivalence about inclusion into a normalized administrative
regime. For example, in 1941, the then Assistant Commissioner
Conder C. Henry expressed significant concerns over the inclusion
of rule making in a proposed Senate Bill. He objected to the
inclusion of broad grant of rulemaking power because it "is our
opinion that a rule can be promulgated to fit the average situation
but not the special facts of a particular case, and the facts of
1 39
practically every application for patent are particular."
Likewise, he objected to a section that would have prohibited
agencies from relying on "unpublished rules, instructions or
statements" because such a provision:
[S]eeks to attain stability and rigidity in, administrative
adjudications; that it seeks that complete and absolute legal
certainty which is sought to be attained by fixed, wholly inflexible,
rules authoritatively prescribed in advance to cover every possible
circumstance and applied to intangibles (such as inventions) ...
with machinelike precision. This idea is based upon the age-old
longing for permanency, regularity, ultimate security, and sameness

136. 1942 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 22; see also
1941 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 13 (referring to a
debate within the Section on whether only attorneys would be allowed to
practice before the USPTO).
137. 1943 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 14.
138. 1944 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 16-18.

139. Administrative Procedure:Hearing on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before
a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 612-13 (1941)
(statement of Conder C. Henry, Assistant Comm'r on Patents).
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in human relationships; and it is fantasy. 140
After passage of the APA itself, Caspar Ooms, Commissioner
of the Patent Office, stated in response to the question why he
believed "this Act was not intended to apply to the Patent Office:"
That has been expressed at various times in earlier drafts of the
legislation. As the Act is now drawn it does apply to the Patent
Office in the few respects I have enumerated. That is, we are not
expressly excluded as we were in one of the earlier drafts. But all of
the studies shook us off. They took one look at the Patent Office and
said that they did not want to get into there, that it was too
It is unfortunate, because if one studies that very
complex.
interesting development of review beyond the Patent Office, of
Patent Office adjudications, starting back in 1836 and sees it
changes from year to year you have some appreciation of the fact
141
that the problem of review of administrative decisions is not new.
Notably, in this passage, Commissioner Ooms referred to an
article written by P.J. Federico 142-who would later become one of
the primary drafters of the Patent Act of 1952--outlining the
historical practices associated with adjudication before the
USPTO.143 In a narrower respect as to rulemaking, Commissioner
Ooms noted that he believed that the APA did not apply to most of
the rulemakings undertaken by the USPTO, since "t]he statute
does not expressly require it with respect to the Patent Office
because of the very broad exemptions, inasmuch as most of our
rules are procedural or formulations of policy expressed in the
This view, expressed by Commissioner Ooms, is
statute. 144
mirrored by the text of Section 6 of the 1952 Patent Act.
Section 6's reliance on the textual language from the Patent
Act of 1870, then, is not unintentional. In significant ways,
Section 6 seeks to preserve and re-state the role of the USPTO as
independent from the type of procedural safeguards associated
Thus, the peculiar
with the modern administrative state.
relationship that the USPTO has had with the APA is due, in
some significant sense, to this early skepticism-if not outright
resistance-to the usefulness of administrative law to the patent
regime. This, of course, has had significant consequences.

140. Id. at 613.
141. Caspar W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and the
Administrative ProcedureAct in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 253, 276-77 (George Warren ed.,
1947).
142. Id. at 277.
143. See generally P.J. Frederico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals, 22 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 838 (1940) (tracing the history of appeals from USPTO
decisions).
144. Ooms, supra note 141, at 275.
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First, a whole set of ancillary administrative law doctrines,
such as the question of selecting what is the appropriate standard
for judicial review under the APA, or the question of standing for
third party interests, has not been substantively applied to the
Patent Act.
Moreover, it has created a situation where
participation in the patent regime is significantly under-theorized.
In many respects, the patent regime has not always successfully
incorporated theories of participation, whether it be interest group
pluralism or participatory and deliberative democratic theory, and
thus the type of constituency conflict at the heart of Tafas has not
always been successfully channeled
within the patent
145
administrative regime.

III. A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO PATENT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A new approach is needed if Tafas represents a new
movement towards rejecting patent exceptionalism.
The
Government's briefs in Tafas posit a full assimilation into the
larger administrative regime, with the interpretative decisionmaking of the USPTO offered a full-fledged Chevron deference.
Full assimilation into the administrative regime, however, might
not be possible given the unique qualities of patent law. Principle
one-that USPTO agency action must be reconciled with standard
administrative doctrine-attempts to articulate the ways in which
the unique nature of patent procedures can be accommodated with
administrative law.
Principle two-that reconciliation must
involve the patent civil society-is a necessary corollary to the first
because USPTO reconciliation to the administrative state would
increase opportunities for sustained third party challenges to
administrative action.
A. Principle One: USPTO Agency Action Must Be Reconciled
With StandardAdministrative Doctrine
Reconciling the USPTO with the wider administrative state
involves two choices: full reconciliation with the administrative
state, or a more partial reconciliation with the administrative
state. In the end, if it does anything useful, Tafas makes explicit
the growing urge to assimilate administrative law within patent
law. Indeed, Tafas should indicate the end of the culture of patent
145. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative
Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139 (2001)
(outlining the development of an interest group pluralism in post war United
States, and the clash between increased administrative rulemaking and
heightened judicial review of such rulemaking); Kali Murray, Rules for
Radicals: A "Politics"of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63 (2006),
(outlining the different types of political models that can inform patent reform
models).
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exceptionalism within the context of administrative law. Full
assimilation is a necessary development in patent law for three
reasons.
First, the scope of administrative action undertaken by the
USPTO has developed in considerable ways since the enactment of
Section 6 in 1952. The clear text of the Patent Act itself has
served to obscure other changes in the administrative regime.
This is an achievement that stands in stark contrast to the
Copyright Act, which has become a somewhat unwieldy
conglomerate of various provision engrafted upon the original
text. 146 This supposed serene consistency of the Patent Act has
done much to mask a significant underlying dynamism in the
patent administrative regime. Initially, the role of the USPTO
underwent significant administrative expansion with subsequent
amendments to the Patent Act of 1952, including providing
different types of regulatory procedures, such as: (1) reexamination; 147 (2) voluntary arbitration; 148 (3) patent restoration
extension; 149 and (4) optional inter partes re-examination
proceedings. 150 Other amendments to the 1952 Act also expanded
the USPTO's role in advising compliance with international
5
treaties.' '
146. See generally David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1233 (2004) (outlining the failure to maintain a concise
copyright statute after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976).
147. See An Act to amend the patent and trademark laws, Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015-17 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 30207 (West 2009)) (outlining changes to re-examination procedures).
148. See An Act to authorize appropriations to the Patent and Trademark
Office in the Department of Commerce, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97247, 96 Stat. 317, 322 (1982) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 294 (West
2009)) (adding voluntary arbitration procedures for the resolution of patent
disputes).
149. See An Act to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
revise the procedures for new drug applications, to amend title 35, United
States Code, to authorize the extension of the patents for certain regulated
products, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598-02
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2009)) (adding new
procedure for patent extension).
150. See Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-567 to -70 (1999) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C.A. § 311-18 (West 2009)) (enacting procedures for the optional use of
inter partes re-examination proceedings); See generally Edward C.
Walterscheid & Kenneth L. Cage, Jurisdiction of the Patent and Trademark
Office to Consider the Validity of Issued Patents, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 444
(1979) (outlining the changes in patent law that allowed the USPTO to
consider regulation of patents within the post-issuance context).
151. See An Act to amend section 6 of title 35, United States Code, "Patents,"
to authorize domestic and international studies and programs relating to
patents and trademarks, Pub. L. No. 92-132, 85 Stat. 364, 364 (1971) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 2009)) (current version at 35 U.S.C.A. §
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Such changes are significant in that they have expanded the
number of tasks that constitute the administrative authority of
the USPTO, a change that is recognized in the text of the newly
constituted Section 2. Section 2 is qualitatively more expansive
than Section 6. In particular, the text recognizes the role of the
USPTO in facilitating and processing the applications and serving
in an advisory capacity on international treaties and
cooperation. 152 A real risk exists in not understanding the
contours of this new regime, and the one difference between Tafas
and Merck may lie (correctly) in understanding the new textual
scope of Section 2.
Second, the contours of the patent regime have expanded
considerably to allow a number of other administrative actors such
as the ITC, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), to substantively regulate the post-issuance grant of a
patent. 153
These agencies are subject to the broader
administrative law framework and in fact, as previously discussed,
the Federal Circuit itself has developed a more consistent
approach in its administrative law jurisprudence within the
context of the ITC.154 This standard is in stark contrast with the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in the context of patent law, which
has often bore little resemblance to more standardized
55
administrative review.1
Third, the APA requires that a government agency engage in
a substantive, transparent process that allows interested citizens
the ability to challenge agency refusal to fully account for relevant
factors in agency decision-making.1 56 These requirements are in

2(b)(8)-(13)) (expanding USPTO's advisory capacity over ensuring compliance
with international treaties); An Act to carry into effect certain provisions of
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 94-131, 89
Stat. 685, 685-92 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.A.) (increasing USPTO's advisory capacity to ensure compliance with
the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCI"')); An Act to amend the patent laws
implementing the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Pub. L. No. 99-616, 100 Stat.
3485, 3485-87 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.A.)
(enlarging USPTO's advisory capacity to ensure compliance with the PCT).
152. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(C) (stating that the USPTO ensures processing
of the patent applications); 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(B)(12) (outlining the USPTO's
advisory capacity in international relations).
153. See generally Kali Murray, The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic
Patent Reform in an Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA 289 (2008) (outlining the
roles of federal agencies other than the USPTO in the regulation of patents).
154. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (reviewing the Federal
Circuit's more deferential treatment of the ITC's rulemaking).
155. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 3, at 318-20 (outlining the level of
review that the Federal Circuit should accord the actions of the USPTO).
156. See., e.g., Jason J. Czarneski, Revisiting the Tense RelationshipBetween

2008]

A PrincipledApproach to PatentAdministrative Law

57

accord with another trend in patent law: transparency
mechanisms have substantially increased in current patent law.
This trend toward more transparency began with the
implementation of the eighteen-month publication requirement
under Section 122.157 This transparency in publication of a patent
application has been heightened by electronic mechanisms such as
the Patent Application Information Retrieval ("PAIR") system that
allows for a substantive review of the entire prosecution history of
a patent application.158 These projects arise in no significant part
due to a grant of authority in Section 122, which grants the
USPTO final and unreviewable authority to release or not release
59
information concerning a published patent application.1
Indeed, transparency mechanisms have been deepened
significantly by experiments such as the Peer to Patent Project,
which allowed designated third parties to comment on designated
prior art during the course of a limited number of patent
applications. 160 These collected transparency requirements move
the USPTO towards a broader role than that initially
contemplated by the 1952 grant of authority in Section 6.
It is far more likely, however, that patent law would only be
gradually reconciled with administrative
law. Significant
challenges await full assimilation. First, the policy-making forms
outlined by the Patent Act do not usefully correspond with those
outlined in the APA. Section 551 of the APA outlines three types
of agency proceedings (rulemakings, adjudication, and licensing)
and five types of agency actions (rules, orders, licenses, sanctions
and relief). 161 The Patent Act outlines a range of administrative
actions that do not neatly fit in these enumerated categories.

the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National
Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 13-16 (2006) (outlining the
usefulness of the APA in providing more stringent review of environmental
decision-making).
157. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 122(b) (outlining the publication requirement for
patent application). Four exceptions exist to this publication requirement, for:
(1) an application that is no longer pending; (2) an application is subject to a
secrecy order; (3) an application is a provisional application; (4) an application
that is for a design patent application. Id. § 122(b)(2)(A).
158. See USTPO Public Pair Database, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/
portal/pair (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (allowing for online patent searches at
the USPTO's website).
159. 35 U.S.C.A § 122(b).
160. See The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review,
http://www.peertopatent.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (reporting that with
the consent of the inventor, the patent examination is opened online to enable
the public to submit prior art and commentary on pending patent
applications).
161. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(4)-(13) (West 2009) (defining the types of agency
actions and proceedings that are covered by the APA).
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Beyond the conduct of the rulemaking at stake in Tafas, the
USPTO is responsible for administering the following categories of
agency decision-making under the Patent Act: (1) the examination
of patent application by patent examiners; 16 2 (2) the conduct of
interference between two patent applicants; 163 (3) the review of
examination and interference proceedings before the BPAI; 16 4 (4)
the ability to restore patent term under the Hatch-Waxman Act;16 5
(5) the ability to conduct a review of reissued patents, 16 6 terminal
disclaimers, 6 7 and certificate of corrections issued for agency and
patentee mistakes; 1 8 and (6) the conduct of ex parte re70
examination'6 9 and optional inter partes proceedings.
The process of reconciling the Patent Act's enumerated policymaking forms with the review standards of the APA has been an
awkward one. For instance, in In re Gartside,the Federal Circuit
confronted how to classify appeals of examiner decisions and
interference proceedings before the USPTO171
The Court
ultimately determined that the decisions of the BPAI were to be
reviewed as an "agency hearing" because, unlike other formalized
adjudicatory proceedings, decisions of the BPAI were followed by a
subsequent trial de novo at the district court. 172 This
determination had the direct consequence of allowing the Federal
Circuit to review BPAI decisions under what it termed the more
stringent "substantial evidence" rather than the more deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of APA Section 706 (2)(A) that
applies to broader categories of agency action. 73
162. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 131 (West 2009) (outlining the authority of the
Director to conduct examination of patents).
163. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 135 (West 2009) (proscribing the conduct of
interference proceedings).
164. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (describing the procedures of BPAD; 35 U.S.C.A. §
134 (West 2009) (stating the right of review before the BPAI).
165. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 155-155A (West 2009) (explaining the authority of the
USPTO in restoring the patent terms of pharmaceutical patents under
regulatory review of the FDA).
166. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2009) (outlining procedures for regulation
of reissues).
167. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West 2009) (outlining procedures for regulation
of terminal disclaimers).
168. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 254-56 (West 2009) (outlining procedures for
regulation of certifications of corrections).
169. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 302-07 (West 2009) (outlining procedures for ex parte
reexamination procedures).
170. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 311-18 (explaining procedures for optional inter
partes reexamination proceedings).
171. 203 F.3d 1305, 1311-13 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
172. Id. at 1313.
173. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) ; Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1311-12. As Stuart
Benjamin and Arti Rai note, the Federal Circuit's contention that the
"substantial evidence" standard is a more stringent one is not a well-settled
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Choice of policy-making forms, then, has significant
consequences for what type of judicial review is possible.
Moreover, such choice of form can be abused. In particular, the
USPTO has often issued significant interpretations of rules in the
guise of policy guidance documents. For instance, the USPTO
recently issued its Examination Guidelines for Determining
Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of the Supreme Court
Decision in KSR International v. Telefex, Inc.174 By issuing the
decision as a guidance document rather than a substantive
rulemaking, the USPTO avoided judicial review under Section
553(b)(A) of the APA, which exempts "interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" from its scope. 176 Notably, other agencies with a
significant use of interpretative guidelines, such as the Treasury
Department, also have had a difficult time reconciling their
particular regime with the broader goals of administrative law. 176
Moreover, the differences in form reflect real clashes in the
values of the respective regimes. For example, in Brand v.
Miller,177 the Federal Circuit concluded that the members of BPAI
could not rely on their own individualized "common-sense"
expertise to undertake non-obviousness determinations under
KSR because that information was not "on the written record" as
required by the APA.1v8 On the one hand, such a written record
requirement is consistent with the APA mandate that agencies
undertake their decision-making in a transparent matter. 179 On
the other hand, as critics have noted, denying the examiners of the
BPAI the ability to rely on internal "common-sense" judgments in
making non-obviousness determinations places them at a
significant disadvantage as opposed to other decision-makers, such
question of law. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 3, at 291-92.
174. 72
Fed.
Reg.
57526
(Oct.
10,
2007)

available

at

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/72fr57526.pdf.
175. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)(A).
176. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside of the Lines: Examining
Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1795-99 (2007).
177. 487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
178. Id. at 868.
179. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (requiring federal agencies to make various
information open to the public); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (mandating that federal
agencies conduct open meetings in many instances); 5 U.S.C.A. § 553
(proscribing that federal agencies open rulemakings to public comment); see
also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act
1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public
Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up to, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 511,
521 (2006) (explaining that Congress passed the APA in response to public
demands for transparency in government and a desire to standardize agency
disclosure of information).
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as patent examiners and district court judges, who may also make
18 0
determinations under interferences.
Brand demonstrates the conflict between a standardized
norm of transparency valued by the administrative regime, which
may be diametrically opposed to the norm of contextual evaluation
favored by the patent regime. What then are the ways-without
full assimilation-that the patent state can become more
reconciled to the administrative state? First, administrative law
has a number of flexible doctrines that can achieve a partial
reconciliation.
As discussed previously, judicial review of
interpretative agency decision-making can be undertaken within a
persuasiveness framework. 81
The Skidmore persuasiveness
framework has much to recommend it for use in a reconciled
administrative framework. The framework covers a broad range
of administrative actions that the USPTO undertakes and
moreover, the multi-factor test is a contextual one that analyzes
the circumstances in which agency decision-making can occur.
Second, reconciliation could involve a more nuanced
appreciation of the time in which the USPTO is undertaking an
administrative choice. The USPTO's ability to regulate in the
post-issuance context is potentially more constrained than its
ability within the pre-issuance context. Under Section 2(a), the
general grant of authority, the USPTO "shall be responsible for
s
the granting and issuing of patents. 182
The terms "granting" and
"issuing" can be seen as temporal constraints upon the powers of
the USPTO in so far both refer to the process of obtaining the
patent. Upon issuance of the patents, the USPTO's authority is
funneled through fixed avenues of administrative action such as
reissue, terminal disclaimer, or certificates of correction. Thus,
the specific grant of authority in Section 2(a) provides a significant
limit on the authority of the USPTO to regulate patent authority.
Moreover, such limits make sense when other agencies have a
significant role in regulating patent law after the patent has
issued. For instance, the ITC regulates-and has the power to
issue precedential opinions-on potentially infringing imported
items. 8 3 This is particularly useful in addressing the temporal
context, pre- or post-issuance, in which the USPTO is undertaking
180. Robert C. Nissen & Charles L. Gholz, Brand v. Miller Prevents
Administrative Patent Judges from Using Their Common Sense in Inter Partes
Proceedings, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 321, 324-25 (2008).
181. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (explaining the Skidmore
persuasiveness framework and its use by federal courts); see also supra notes
97-111 and accompanying text (advocating for the Skidmore persuasiveness
framework to be applied to the patent regime).

182. 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a).
183. See Murray, supra note 153, at 300 (exploring the role of the ITC in the
post-issuance regulation of patents).
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its decision-making action. The terrain of administrative law,
then, offers a fruitful way to achieve gradual reconciliation of the
two regimes. Gradual reconciliation can also be achieved in ways
suggested by Tafas. Patent regulators and the patent community
itself can become more self-conscious in how they approach
administrative law.
The mantra of patent execptionalism
prevents a sustained assessment of how these two areas of law
substantively work together.
B. Principle Two: ReconciliationMust Involve the Patent Civil
Society
In Tafas, at least thirty-eight parties submitted briefs at the
district court level (a rather remarkable number, given that this
was the initiallevel of review).,' 4 This would generally seem as if
it were a healthy development. The presence of so many amicus
briefs, however, really demonstrates how distorted administrative
law practice is in the current patent regime. These parties
submitted amicus briefs for one simple reason: they did not have
the independent ability to bring a claim under the APA. Such
claims were limited by the Federal Circuit's holding in Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg ("ALDF').185 In ALDF, the Federal
Circuit held that the plaintiffs at stake-farming associations,
farmers, and animal protection groups-could not sustain either a
constitutional standing challenge because of the difficulty of
establishing a concrete injury in fact;186 or even if they could, none
of the claimants fell within the zone of interests protected by the
Patent Act (and so therefore could not bring a claim under the
APA).18 7 Indeed, the Federal Circuit in ALDF implied that the
entire statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded third party
participation under the APA.
ALDF is remarkable, then, in that it precludes interested
parties from bringing challenges to a range of USPTO
administrative actions.
Moreover, ALDF is the crucial case
precedent in which the Federal Circuit first outlined its argument
that the USPTO authority under Section 6 did not include the
power to undertake substantive rulemaking.18 8 Indeed, it is the
first case that Merck cites to in its crucial holding.18 9 The Federal

184. See supra note 19 (listing the individuals and groups that filed amicus
briefs in the Tafas district court case).
185. 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see Murray, supra note 145, at 81-89
(discussing the standing issues in ALDF).
186. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931-35.
187. Id. at 938-39.
188. Id. at 927-30.
189. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549-50 (citing ALDF, 932 F.2d at 930). The court in
ALDF stated that the: "authority granted in section 6 is directed to the
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Circuit's holding in ALDF-that the USPTO did not have the right
to engage in substantive rulemaking-is linked to its subsequent
holding that prudential and constitutional standing should not be
accorded to third parties to challenge pre-issuance rulings under
the APA.190 In light of ALDF, an interesting counterpoint exists to
the USPTO's advocacy of a greater deference to its agency choices
under the Chevron deference framework: if such deference is
given, is the denial of constitutional and prudential standing to
third parties to bring challenges to USPTO still a relevant way of
viewing the patent regime? This potential broadening of third
party interests suggests that ultimately, any expansive changes to
the USPTO's authority should occur at the legislative branch as
only Congress is in the position to contemplate such significant
changes to the overall patent regime.
A principled approach to patent administrative law has to
include the ability of third parties-through expanded standingto bring claims. The failure to properly accord full standing on
third parties creates a distorted administrative process. Third
parties have a more significant incentive to police the
administrative actors, where, unlike the issue at stake in Tafas,
the stakes are not high. Third party advocate groups offer a
consistent way to ensure that the administrative actor is acting in
a coherent and transparent manner. For example, the USPTO's
issuances of what it termed interpretative guidelines in the wake
of KSR have had a significant impact on the subsequent
examination of claims. The USPTO's classification of these rules
as "interpretative rules" can be challenged under administrative
law doctrine. These rules, however, were not challenged. Such a
classification, however, might have been challenged if advocate
groups were actually empowered to do so. The common response
to active third party participation is that an increase in third party
participation would significantly lessen the already compromised
efficiency of the USPTO. Such a response, however, presumes that
the only administrative action at stake before the USPTO is
examination. As previously discussed, the USPTO is engaged in a
multitude of tasks beyond examination and an active and engaged
third party civil society must be necessarily engaged in ensuring
that those tasks are completed. A more active recognition of third
party interests would be beneficial in the work of smoothing
patent law's rough edges.

'conduct of proceedings' before the Office. A substantive declaration with
regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent statutes.., does not
fall within the usual interpretation of such statutory language." ALDF, 932

F.2d at 930.
190. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

In

many

ways,

the

perspectives

of

the

USPTO's

administrative authority remain stuck in the past, left in the
moment of those vociferous debates in the 1930s and 1940s over
its ultimate participation in the modern administrative state. The
real question of Tafas is whether the patent administrative state,
which has grown more sophisticated and complex, needs to remain
stuck at that moment. While the textual ambiguity at the heart of
Section 2 remains until a potential Congressional amendment, its
ambiguities can be temporarily resolved by a reliance on the
Skidmore persuasiveness framework.
Moreover, the two
principles outlined above-reconciling patent and administrative
law, and bringing in third parties to undertake the task of that
reconciliation-offer important ways in which to guide the "new
normal" of the patent administrative state.

